The world’s largest diamond miner, De Beers, is finalizing its sale with no significant involvement from India, despite the country’s dominant role in diamond cutting and polishing. Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever recently visited Mumbai’s diamond district, where longstanding ties between Antwerp and India were highlighted. However, neither location participated in the bidding for De Beers’ 85% stake, now valued at about $1 billion. This absence prompts speculation over whether India is overlooking a strategic chance or deliberately stepping back.
India handles 90% of global diamond cutting and polishing, with Surat serving as the industry’s global center. The nation also holds sway in diamond governance, set to lead the Kimberley Process in 2026. Key figures such as Mehul Shah, president of the World Federation of Diamond Bourses, and Kirit Bhansali, chairman of GJEPC and a CIBJO board member, actively shape international diamond policies. Despite this influence, India has not entered the upstream mining sector during this critical transition.
The situation presents major challenges. Anglo American, De Beers’ parent company, has reduced the unit’s value to $2.3 billion, down from $12.75 billion in 2011, following $6.8 billion in cumulative impairments. The miner reported a $511 million underlying EBITDA loss in 2025, with rough diamond production at its lowest since 2004, totaling 98.8 million carats. Key mines, including South Africa’s Venetia—closed for two years—and Canada’s Gahcho Kué, face operational and financial strain. Meanwhile, Botswana’s Okavango Diamond Company plans to raise its local allocation to 50% by 2035. The financial demands are immense: the Jwaneng Underground project alone requires $6 billion in investment, surpassing the $5 billion annual rough diamond market.
India’s restraint stems from more than financial caution. A 5-10% stake in De Beers would cost between $59 million and $118 million, a modest sum compared to the country’s $71.98 billion in gold imports last year. When India targets a critical resource, it acts decisively, as demonstrated by its state-backed acquisition of lithium assets in Argentina. The lack of Indian bidders suggests a deliberate choice: controlling the processing bottleneck may offer greater strategic advantage than engaging in upstream mining.
India’s growing focus on laboratory-grown diamonds supports this assessment. The shutdown of Australia’s Argyle mine in 2020, once the primary rough supplier for Surat’s industry, exposed the dangers of overdependence on a single source. By shifting to lab-grown diamonds, India has secured an alternative supply chain, protecting its artisans without direct exposure to mining risks. This move reflects a broader preference for regulatory and industrial control over high-cost ownership.
Three key factors likely explain India’s approach. First, the financial risks may outweigh potential gains: De Beers’ declining production and heavy capital requirements could discourage investment despite its current low valuation. Second, India’s private diamond sector remains fragmented, making it difficult to assemble the $6 billion+ needed for deep-level kimberlite mining. Finally, India may be adopting a wait-and-see approach, using its 90% share of global polishing capacity to influence outcomes without direct investment.
